We examined the cardiovascular physiology of guilt and pride to elucidate physiological substrates underpinning the behavioral motivations of these moral emotions. Although both emotions motivate prosocial behavior, guilt typically inhibits ongoing behavior, whereas pride reinforces current behavior. To succeed in eliciting real emotions, we used a novel social interaction task. We found dissociable sympathetic activation during guilt and pride; specifically, Guilt participants experienced prolonged cardiac sympathetic arousal as measured by preejection period (PEP), whereas Pride participants experienced transient non-cardiac somatic arousal and a shift to low frequency (LF) power in the cardiac spectrogram. This dissociation supports their distinctive motivational functions. Higher self-reported Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) sensitivity was furthermore uniquely associated with guilt, supporting its function as a punishment cue.

Previous research suggests that (a) racial group membership attenuates empathy, and subsequent prosocial helping behaviour, towards out-group members, and (b) helping behaviour is modified by the potential helperâ??s pool of cognitive resources. It remains unclear, however, how cognitive load influences empathy and helping towards racial in- versus out-group members. We investigated this question using a sample of 30 White females. After completing either a high or a low cognitive-load task, participants viewed video clips depicting distressed White or Black females. We examined cardiovascular responses, self-reported empathic responses, and helping behaviour in response to the clips. We found no effect of racial group membership on empathic responding or on helping behaviour across cognitive-load conditions. However, results suggested that high cognitive load attenuates empathic responding, leading to decreased helping behaviour towards both racial in- and out-group members. Interestingly, a high internal motivation to respond without prejudice was associated with increased helping towards out-group members, but only under conditions of low cognitive load.

We describe a method to administer a controlled, effective stressor to humans in the laboratory. The method combines the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and the Cold Pressor Test into a single, believable procedure called the Fear-Factor Stress Test (FFST). In the procedure, participants imagine auditioning for the reality television show Fear Factor. They stand before a video recorder and a panel of judges while (a) delivering a motivational speech, (b) performing a verbal arithmetic task, and (c) placing one hand into a bucket of ice water for up to 2 min. We measured subjective anxiety, heart rate, and salivary cortisol in three groups of young adults (n = 30 each, equal numbers of men and women): FFST, TSST, and Control (a placebo version of the FFST). Although the FFST and TSST groups were not distinguishable at the cortisol measure taken 5 min post-manipulation, at 35 min postmanipulation average cortisol levels in the TSST group had returned to baseline, whereas those in the FFST group continued to rise. The proportion of individual cortisol responders (≥ 2 nmol/l increase over baseline) in the TSST and FFST groups did not differ at the 5-min measure, but at the 35-min measure the FFST group contained significantly more responders. The findings indicate that the FFST induces a more robust and sustained cortisol response (which we assume is a marker of an HPA-axis response) than the TSST, and that it does so without increasing participant discomfort or incurring appreciably greater resource and time costs.

The sleep-to-forget, sleep-to-remember (SFSR) hypothesis states that the neurobiological environment provided by rapid-eye movement (REM)-rich sleep decouples the content of an emotional memory from its attendant emotional arousal. This decoupling allows divergent attenuation and enhancement effects (i.e., erosion of the memory’s emotional tone and simultaneous strengthening of its content). However, support for this proposal is mixed. An alternative account suggests there might be convergent attenuation and enhancement (i.e., elevated emotional arousal is positively coupled with enhanced emotional memory). We tested predictions emerging from the SFSR hypothesis using (a) individuals diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; n = 21), (b) trauma-exposed non-PTSD individuals (n = 19), and (c) healthy controls (n = 20). We included PTSD-diagnosed individuals because they typically experience altered REM sleep, impaired emotional memory, and heightened emotional arousal in response to threatening stimuli. Participants were assessed before and after both an 8-h period of polysomnographically monitored sleep and an 8-h period of waking activity. The assessment included exposure to negatively valenced, positively valenced, and neutral pictures before the 8-h delay, and a recognition task afterward. We measured emotional arousal by recording psychophysiological responses to the pictures, both pre- and post-delay. Results indicated no significant between-group differences in emotional memory accuracy or arousal. However, after a sleep-filled delay, pictures of all categories were recognized with equal accuracy, whereas after a wake-filled delay, negative pictures were recognized preferentially. Furthermore, the findings demonstrated that a sleep-filled delay was associated with attenuated emotional arousal to pictures of all categories, whereas a wake-filled delay was associated with a rise in emotional arousal across the day. Intriguingly, poorer recognition accuracy for valenced (but not neutral) pictures was predicted by an interaction of increased REM fragmentation and increased emotional arousal. In summary, we found some support for the SFSR hypothesis in the way it describes the REM- and arousal-based mechanisms that process emotional material. We also, however, found disconfirming evidence regarding the outcome of that process (i.e., sleep did not favor consolidation of emotional over neutral memory), and we demonstrated a convergence between attenuation of emotional arousal and weakening of emotional content relative to neutral content.

The cognitive construct of prospective memory (PM) refers to the capacity to encode, retain and execute delayed intentions (e.g. to remember to buy milk on the way home). Although previous research suggests that PM performance is enhanced by healthy sleep, conclusions tend to be drawn based on designs featuring ecologically unnatural manipulations (e.g. total sleep deprivation). This study investigates whether a more common everyday experience (bedtime stress) affects next-day PM performance and, in so doing, also contributes to the heretofore inconsistent literature on stress and PM. Forty young adults received PM task instructions and were then assigned to either a stress condition (exposure to a laboratory-based stress-induction manipulation; n = 20, 9 women) or a non-stress condition (exposure to a non-stressful control manipulation; n = 20, 12 women). After completing the experimental manipulation, all participants had their objective sleep quality measured over a full night of polysomnographic monitoring. Upon awakening, they completed the PM task. Analyses detected significant between-group differences in terms of stress outcomes, sleep quality and PM performance: Participants exposed to the manipulation experienced heightened signs of stress (captured using a composite variable that included self-report, psychophysiological and endocrinological measures), had longer sleep latencies and poorer sleep depth and displayed significantly longer reaction times to PM cues. An interaction between experimental condition (being exposed to the stressor) and disrupted sleep (longer sleep latency) significantly predicted poorer next-day PM reaction time. We interpret these findings as indicating that bedtime stress, which leads to heightened presleep arousal, affects sleep processes and, consequently, the deployment of attentional resources during next-day execution of a delayed intention.